The European Union (EU) has long been a significant global actor in trade and governance, shaping policies that resonate far beyond its borders. However, in developing countries such as Ghana and across Africa, EU policies are increasingly viewed with skepticism.
Historically lauded for promoting trade, development, and good governance, the EU now faces criticism for policies perceived by many Africans as exploitative and disproportionately beneficial to European interests.
This perception has fostered a gradual shift in allegiance toward emerging partners like China, India, and, to some extent, Russia, whose trade, governance, and development engagements are often seen as somehow equitable and mutually beneficial.
For many Africans, EU trade policies reflect a continuation of the exploitative practices rooted in colonial history. Despite a facade of equality, trade agreements with the EU often reinforce structural inequalities. Ghana’s cocoa and mining industries, for example, exemplify this imbalance.
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While Ghana is one of the world’s largest cocoa producers, the vast majority of profits from chocolate sales accrue to European companies that dominate the processing and marketing stages of the value chain. Attempts by Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire to establish a Living Income Differential (LID) to secure fairer prices for cocoa farmers have met resistance from European buyers, reinforcing the perception that EU policies overly prioritize European economic interests over African livelihoods.
EU policies such as corporate due diligence, green transition measures, and procurement rules often place undue burdens on developing countries. While these regulations aim to ensure sustainability and ethical practices, they disproportionately affect African exporters. For instance, Ghanaian businesses exporting agricultural products like yam, cocoa, and cashew to the EU must navigate complex and expensive compliance requirements.
This limits access to European markets for smaller businesses that lack the resources to meet these stringent standards, effectively sidelining them in favor of larger, more established European players. Such policies are often viewed not as tools for sustainability but as protectionist measures that stifle competition from developing countries.
Many people argue that these regulations perpetuate dependence on European aid rather than fostering genuine trade partnerships that empower African economies.
The EU often links trade agreements to governance reforms, legal measures, and anti-corruption initiatives, positioning itself as a global advocate for transparency and accountability. While these initiatives are commendable in principle, they are frequently criticized for their paternalistic tone, double standards, and lack of contextual understanding.
For example, the EU’s insistence on governance and corruption-free reforms tied to trade agreements can appear hypocritical when juxtaposed with Europe’s alleged tolerance for money laundering and complicity in enabling illicit financial flows through illegal gold, diamond, and other precious mineral mining activities from Africa.
These illegal mining practices—popularly referred to as galamsey in Ghana and zama zama in South Africa—underscore the EU’s apparent reluctance to confront its own role in perpetuating global inequalities. In addition, many African critics argue that the EU’s policies fail to respect local cultural values and societal norms.
The EU’s approach often appears to impose Western ideologies on governance, investment, and development, disregarding the unique historical, political, cultural, and social contexts of African countries. This perceived disregard for African values reinforces the belief that EU policies are designed to serve European interests rather than foster equitable partnerships.
In stark contrast to the EU, other non-European countries’ approaches to trade and development have gained considerable appeal across Africa. China’s focus, which seems to be on infrastructure development, direct investments, transfer of skills and expertise, and less intrusive governance requirements, has positioned it as a more reliable and equitable partner.
In Ghana, Chinese investments in critical sectors such as infrastructure have provided tangible benefits. Projects like the Bui Dam, Accra-Kumasi highway, and Jamestown fishing harbor—which play crucial roles in trade and business—financed and constructed by Chinese companies, underscore China’s commitment to mutually beneficial outcomes. Similarly, UAE and India have increased their engagements across East and West Africa, offering trade partnerships that prioritize development goals over restrictive policies.
Unlike the EU, which often emphasizes aid and regulatory conditions, the rest emphasizes partnerships that resonate with Ghanaian and African aspirations for self-reliance and progress.
To regain its appeal and foster genuine partnerships, the EU must address the root causes of these negative perceptions. First, the EU should adopt a more collaborative approach that recognizes the unique challenges faced by developing countries. Rather than imposing one-size-fits-all policies, the EU should co-create trade agreements that prioritize mutual benefits and empower African economies to move up the value chain.
Secondly, the EU must provide tangible support for Africa’s green transition. This includes funding for renewable energy and eco-friendly projects, technology transfer, and capacity building to help African businesses comply with sustainability standards without bearing undue financial burdens. Providing subsidies or streamlined processes for smaller exporters could alleviate the challenges faced by businesses in meeting EU standards.
Finally, the EU must address its own role in perpetuating global inequalities. This includes taking a decisive stance to respect cultural values and differences while actively combating illicit financial flows, often perpetuated by some government officials and leaders from Africa with Europe’s support, through questionable investments, luxury acquisitions, and property purchases in countries like Switzerland, France, and the Netherlands. By tackling these practices that undermine African economies, the EU can reaffirm its commitment to fairness, transparency, and fostering equitable global partnerships.
In conclusion, while the EU remains a significant player in global trade, its policies are increasingly perceived as exploitative by developing countries like Ghana. This reality, coupled with the rise of alternative partners outside the Global North and a growing awareness among developing countries of their historical and ongoing exploitation, underscores the need for the EU to rethink its approach.
By prioritizing equitable trade relationships and addressing the unintended consequences of its policies, the EU can rebuild trust and foster partnerships that truly benefit all parties involved. Without such changes, in the next 15 to 20 years, the EU risks losing its influence in a rapidly evolving global trade landscape—a costly outcome in an increasingly multipolar world.
